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I. Introduction
Imagine you are called to serve on a federal grand jury. 1 You
sit all day listening to the prosecutor present evidence concerning
an alleged criminal offense committed by a government official. 2
Along with your fellow jurors, you decide that before issuing an
indictment, you want more documents produced or a government
official to come testify before you. 3 The prosecutor then issues a
criminal grand jury subpoena to that government lawyer or
official. Instead of those documents being presented to you, or a
government official coming and testifying before you, the official
evades the subpoena by asserting the government attorney-client
privilege. You may think it a fundamental maxim of common law
that a federal government entity could not assert the common law
attorney-client privilege to “withhold information relating to a
federal criminal offense,” but it is not. 4 As well-established as the
attorney-client privilege is in our legal system, the government
attorney-client privilege is diametrically unsettled. 5 This Note
1. See
HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS
6
(2012),
https://perma.cc/VE29-MJL8 (PDF) (discussing how federal grand jurors are
selected at random from lists of registered voters).
2. See id. at 8 (outlining how federal prosecutors present evidence to grand
jurors).
3. See id. (authorizing the grand jurors to request additional witnesses); see
also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (issuing a subpoena to a
government attorney to answer questions before the grand jury).
4. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1266.
5. See id. at 1272 (discussing the unsettled nature of the government
attorney-client privilege and the differences between the government and
ordinary attorney-client privilege); Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.)
822, 836 (1871) (describing the ordinary attorney-client privilege rule as
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proposes the adoption of a categorical rule that neither a state nor
the federal government may invoke the attorney-client privilege in
response to a criminal grand jury subpoena.
The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary principle and a
longstanding creature of common law. 6 The privilege is meant to
encourage open and honest communication between lawyer and
client, and it protects the disclosure of those communications. 7 The
privilege promotes the administration of justice by allowing
individuals to confidentially communicate with skilled attorneys
and receive sound legal advice. 8 The privilege is not without
limitations though, and should be applied narrowly due to its
power to prevent the production of evidence in criminal cases. 9
Government attorneys and employees remain uncertain about
whether the attorney-client privilege will apply to their
communications when faced with a criminal grand jury
subpoena. 10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had a
chance to weigh in on the issue in 2018 for the first time, but it left
many questions unanswered. 11
well-settled).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (explaining that the common law “governs a claim
of privilege” unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court applies); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law.”).
7. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (discussing the history and purpose of
the attorney-client privilege).
8. See id. (describing how sound legal advice serves public ends, and sound
advice requires full disclosure); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain
fully informed legal advice.
9. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (contending that testimonial privileges
should be applied narrowly); see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973)
(stating that because the privilege acts as an obstacle to evidence being heard in
a court, it should be constrained).
10. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (resigning that the government
attorney-client privilege is uncertain).
11. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 909 F.3d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 2018)
[hereinafter R.I. Grand Jury] (discussing the lower court’s adoption of “what it
viewed to be the majority position on a difficult issue of first impression in this
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The First Circuit rejected the application of a categorical rule
that the Rhode Island government could not assert the
attorney-client privilege in response to a federal grand jury
subpoena. 12 Instead of applying a categorical rule, the court
addressed a number of factors to determine the applicability of the
privilege. 13 The First Circuit court went so far as to say that the
government attorney-client privilege analysis may hinge on who is
the target or subject of the grand jury investigation. 14 The First
Circuit is the fifth court of appeals since 1997 to address the
application of the attorney-client privilege to government
attorneys when faced with a grand jury subpoena stemming from
a criminal investigation. 15 Each circuit took its own analytical
approach to decide the issue, creating a split in the five circuits’
reasoning and holdings. 16
circuit”).
12. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (failing to provide answers to more
specific factors raised in the opinion and instead choosing to “simply reject the
categorical rule that a state government has no attorney-client privilege that can
be invoked in response to a grand jury subpoena”).
13. See id. at 31–32 (including whether there is a federal-state conflict,
whether the government is the subject of the investigation itself, and where the
public interest lies).
14. See id. (stating that if the alleged crimes had been committed by
government actors, the argument against upholding the privilege would carry
more weight).
15. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir.
1997) [hereinafter Whitewater Investigation] (failing to apply the attorney-client
privilege in order to protect the White House Counsel from having to disclose
relevant communications in light of a federal grand jury subpoena); In re Witness
Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter Ill. Grand Jury] (finding that faced with a federal criminal
investigation, no attorney-client privilege exists between state employee and
state lawyer); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that
Deputy White House Counsel could not rely on the attorney-client privilege to
decline answering questions presented by a grand jury). But see United States v.
Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (failing to abrogate the attorney-client
privilege by compelling chief legal counsel to disclose communication with the
governor of Connecticut); R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (holding that no
categorical rule exists precluding government attorneys from asserting the
privilege when faced with a criminal grand jury subpoena).
16. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (failing to sustain a broad no
privilege rule, reasoning that something more is required to prevent the state
from having the right to assert the privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283 (stating
that “government officials have responsibilities not to withhold evidence relating
to criminal offenses from the grand jury”).
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This Note explores the reasoning and factors used by each of
the circuits in deciding whether or not to uphold the privilege.
After considering those factors, this Note argues that there should
be a categorical rule that neither a state nor the federal
government may invoke the attorney-client privilege in response
to a criminal grand jury subpoena. To justify this conclusion, this
Note outlines how current government attorney-client privilege
case law, as well as the policy underpinnings of the privilege itself,
dictate that a categorical rule is appropriate.
Part II discusses the historical foundation of the
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is one of the
oldest privileges, but its applicability in specific instances has been
left to the courts to decide. 17 Part II then moves on to describe the
purpose and importance of the attorney-client privilege. The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage individuals needing legal
assistance to consult attorneys with openness and honesty. 18 The
importance of the privilege rests on promoting the “broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” 19
Finally, Part II briefly discusses the mechanics of applying the
privilege in everyday practice.
Part III discusses the government attorney-client privilege.
Part III highlights the recent developments in the government
attorney-client privilege doctrine and lack of legal history to rely
on in determining the scope of the privilege’s application in the
government context. 20 Part III then discusses whether the
application of the government attorney-client privilege in the
criminal investigation context would be an extension of the
privilege or an exception to the privilege. Part III concludes that
allowing the privilege to apply in this context would be an
extension of the privilege. 21
17. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981) (discussing
the history of the privilege and its common law foundation).
18. See id. at 389 (outlining how consistent the purpose of the privilege has
been throughout American jurisprudence).
19. Id.
20. See Ross. v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting
how little case law there is concerning this issue).
21. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing
that the court needed to determine if this instance was captured by the outer
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Part IV analyzes the five U.S. Court of Appeals’ opinions that
have created a split in the government attorney-client privilege
doctrine. The First Circuit rejected the categorical application of a
rule that the attorney-client privilege would not be available to a
government in response to a federal grand jury subpoena. 22 The
Second Circuit also ruled in favor of allowing the privilege to apply
in this context. 23 The D.C. Circuit, in arguably the most robust of
the circuit opinions, held that government attorneys could not
assert the privilege in order to withhold evidence sought in
connection to a criminal grand jury investigation. 24 The Eighth
Circuit relied heavily on the public’s interest in disclosure by
government officials when it denied the White House’s use of the
attorney-client privilege to avoid the disclosure of communications
to a federal grand jury. 25 The Seventh Circuit also primarily relied
on the duty government lawyers have to act in the interest of the
public when it denied the application of the privilege in this
context. 26 While each of the circuits approached the issue in light
of unique facts, each court provided analysis that can be used to
find a more permanent solution to the issue as discussed in Part
VI. 27
Part V discusses a solution to the circuit split that will help
simplify the government attorney-client privilege doctrine while
upholding the “logic of its principle.” 28 Specifically, whether the
limits of the privilege).
22. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (stating that the facts
of this case led to the conclusion that there should not be a categorical rule).
23. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
a government attorney can assert the privilege when faced with a federal grand
jury subpoena).
24. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1282–83 (determining that government officials
have a responsibility to the public that includes assisting criminal investigations).
25. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying
that the result of their holding would be a chilling effect on government employees
with respect to their candor with government counsel).
26. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that none
of the conversations between the General Counsel and Secretary of State were
privileged “in the face of a federal grand jury subpoena”).
27. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (factoring in federalism
concerns, who is the target of the investigation, as well as the public’s interest in
allowing government employees to communicate confidentially with government
attorneys).
28. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291
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applicability of the government attorney-client privilege in the face
of a federal grand jury subpoena should rest on a factors test or a
categorical approach. Part V first explores whether it should
matter if the government entity is a state or federal government
actor. 29 Second, Part V discusses the First Circuit’s hypothesis that
the prosecutor may need to reveal certain information concerning
the scope of the grand jury’s investigation in order to pierce the
privilege. 30 Finally, Part V analyzes whether the answer to the
question of the privilege’s application is the creation of an ad hoc
balancing test weighing the public’s interest.
Part VI offers the conclusion that a categorical rule against
the application of the government attorney-client privilege in
response to a criminal grand jury subpoena is appropriate. This
conclusion is supported by the need for a certain and consistent
privilege. 31 It is also supported by the concern that a testimonial
privilege may prevent relevant evidence from being presented to a
grand jury concerning potential criminal activity known to
government officials. 32 A categorical rule would also prevent the
use of a balancing test, or arbitrary search for whether public
interest favors the privilege or not. 33 A categorical rule also
benefits individuals working in the government by allowing them
(John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
29. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (“Moreover, the federal-state conflict
that the availability of the attorney-client privilege implicates may cut in favor of
respecting the state’s view of the best balance between the public’s interest in
government transparency and the beneficial aspects of the privilege.”); Ill. Grand
Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (recognizing that federalism is an important aspect of our
system of governing, but failing to see how it is relevant in this instance).
30. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing the issue of the court not
knowing whether the government entity was itself a target or subject of the grand
jury’s investigation).
31. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1998)
(overturning the lower court’s decision who had made the determination “that the
uncertainty introduced by its balancing test was insignificant in light of existing
exceptions to the privilege”).
32. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (highlighting the
reasons why testimonial privileges should be interpreted narrowly).
33. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 409 (discussing the Supreme Court’s resistance
to creating balancing tests to define the outer limits of the privilege); Doe, 399
F.3d at 531 (declining to adopt a balancing test, but then holding that the
privilege will apply, without adopting or setting forth any judicially manageable
test).
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to make informed decisions regarding their legal representation
before consulting with a government attorney about conduct that
could lead to a criminal investigation. 34
II. Introduction to the Attorney-Client Privilege
A. Historical Foundation of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege originated in the sixteenth
century and is one of the “oldest common law privileges.” 35 An
exception to testimonial compulsion, the privilege belonged to the
lawyer and was meant to protect an attorney’s honor by not forcing
them to reveal private confidences in public. 36 This “moral honor”
reasoning lasted until the end of the 1700s. 37 The theoretical
underpinnings that replaced it are much more familiar, looking to
“the necessity of providing subjectively for the client’s freedom of
apprehension in consulting his legal advisor.” 38 This major shift in
policy meant that the privilege came to be understood to belong to
the client and not the attorney. 39
United States case law concerning the privilege developed
slowly prior to the early 1800s. 40 The first reported case concerning
the attorney-client privilege in the United States was Dixon v.
34. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing the
vital need for privileges to be consistent and for individuals to know confidently
what will be covered before consulting with an attorney).
35. United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 66 F. Supp. 3d 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing the privilege as “the oldest of
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law”).
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“The modern attorney-client privilege evolved from an
earlier reluctance of English courts to require lawyers to breach the code of a
gentleman by being compelled to reveal in court what they had been told by
clients.”).
37. See WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2290 (stating that the honor doctrine was
“entirely repudiated” in the late 1700s).
38. Id.
39. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“But the privilege is
that of the client alone . . . .”).
40. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1087 (1978) (discussing the lack
of case law on this issue in the United States prior to the 1820s).
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Parmelee. 41 Judge Paddock denied the specific assertion of the
attorney-client privilege in that case, but strongly supported its
place in American jurisprudence. 42 The privilege continued to
develop in the United States with utilitarian justifications as its
underpinnings. 43 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the
Virginia Supreme Court declared that there was “no rule of law
better settled than” attorneys not being allowed to disclose client
confidences. 44 The attorney-client privilege has remained a stable
piece of our common law system of justice with relatively few
modifications. 45
Presently, there is no question whether the attorney-client
privilege should exist, merely what the scope of the privilege
should be. 46 Courts have contoured the privilege by recognizing
important limitations to the privilege, such as the crime-fraud
exception. 47 The crime-fraud exception is triggered when
communications between client and lawyer are made for the
purpose of getting advice or assistance in the commission of a crime
or fraud. 48 Another recent issue concerning the scope of the
attorney-client privilege arose in the corporate context. 49 The
41. See Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829) (discussing the privilege in detail
and at length in dictum).
42. See id. at 188 (stating that the privilege is an established principle, and
“it is declared repugnant to the policy of the law, to permit the disclosure of secrets
by him whom the law has intrusted therewith”).
43. See KENNETH S. BROUN et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 151 (6th ed.
2006) (resting on utilitarian justifications that allow for franker disclosure by
clients).
44. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 836 (1871).
45. See Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2003)
(discussing how the justifications for the privilege have changed slightly, but
noting the consistent survival of the privilege).
46. See Hazard, supra note 40, at 1062 (describing how there is no
reasonable argument to be made for abolition of the privilege).
47. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989) (concluding the
privilege does not apply to communications made for the purpose of furthering
future wrongdoing).
48. See id. at 563 (discussing the purpose of the exception).
49. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (questioning
whether the privilege only applied to the members of the management “control
group” of a corporation).
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Supreme Court determined that the attorney-client privilege
extends to communications between corporate counsel and
employees. 50 Notwithstanding the foregoing examples, the
standard attorney-client privilege doctrine has remained
remarkably steady in American jurisprudence, while the
government attorney-client privilege has been in flux during its
short tenure. 51
B. The Purpose and Importance of the Privilege
It is essential to understand the purpose of allowing
communications to remain privileged in light of a criminal
investigation in order to develop an informed opinion regarding
whether communications between government lawyers and
government actors should be privileged under the same
circumstances. 52 John Wigmore identified four fundamental
conditions that must be met to establish a privilege against
disclosure:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 53

Wigmore believed that only when these conditions were
present could a privilege be recognized. 54
50. See id. (extending the privilege beyond just the members of the
upper-echelon of a company).
51. Compare R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2018) (allowing the
privilege to shield government attorney communications), with In re Lindsey, 158
F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that the privilege could not be used to
shield government attorney communications).
52. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 292–93 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
the court’s decision will rest on “whether the policy reasons for recognizing an
attorney-client privilege in other contexts apply equally when the United States
seeks information from a government lawyer”).
53. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2285.
54. See id. (noting that the privileges that exist possess each of these
conditions, and ones that have been rejected were missing at least one).
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The foundation of the attorney-client privilege is built on
allowing individuals to seek the counsel of legal experts free from
the apprehension of future disclosure of those communications. 55
While the underlying rationale for the attorney-client privilege has
changed since its original inception, its main concern has always
been “to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” 56
Recognizing a privilege that allows for the withholding of evidence
is juxtaposed by the need for all relevant evidence to be presented
during a trial to ensure an equitable outcome. 57 Long established
in American jurisprudence, it has “been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence.” 58
While there is extensive scholarly support for the recognition
of the attorney-client privilege, Jeremy Bentham, a notable
scholar, opposed the privilege. 59 Bentham believed that because
the innocent had nothing to fear, the individual would not be
deterred from seeking legal advice and that the guilty not seeking
legal advice did not harm the administration of justice. 60 This
reasoning has been rejected by American courts, which have
instead remained steadfast in their protection of communications
made by both the innocent and guilty. 61 While the privilege is

55. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (saying the rule is
“founded upon the necessity” for these communications to be protected from
disclosure).
56. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
57. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (discussing how as
a principle, the public has a right to all evidence, and exclusionary rules are
exceptions).
58. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed.
1940)).
59. See WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2291 (declaring Bentham, Lord Langdale,
and Chief Justice Appleton as the only important names to oppose the privilege).
60. See id. (opposing this reasoning, Wigmore went on to provide three
detailed arguments for why Bentham was incorrect).
61. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (making no
distinction between the guilty and innocent).
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without doubt an important piece of our justice system, it is an
exception to the general rule that all evidence shall be presented. 62
C. The Attorney-Client Privilege Application
The attorney-client privilege is held by the client, who may
invoke the privilege to protect: “(1) a communication, (2) made
between privileged persons, (3) in confidence, (4) for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal assistance to the client.” 63 The Federal
Rules of Evidence do not provide the substance to the privilege, but
instead direct courts to interpret the privilege with principles of
common law “in the light of reason and experience.” 64 Federal
courts use common law to determine if the attorney-client privilege
exists in the specified context. 65 The Supreme Court has noted
“that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions.” 66 The flexibility of
our common law structure is met head-on by the Court’s call for
surety and consistency in the application of the privilege. 67
III. The History and Purpose of the Grand Jury
The Fifth Amendment states that “no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” 68 The grand jury
62. See Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331 (discussing how exceptions from the general
rule may be justified under certain circumstances).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
64. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Winton v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 188 F.R.D. 398, 399
(N.D. Okla. 1999) (“Rule 501 creates no substantive privileges by its own
force. Rule 501 simply informs federal courts of how they are to determine
whether a particular privilege exists.”).
65. See Winton, 188 F.R.D. at 399 (discussing the various sources courts will
look to, such as “state law or common law”).
66. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
67. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996) (rejecting the lower court
and some state’s decisions to implement a balancing component to the privilege
because in some circumstances that would leave a client unsure if the
communications would be confidential).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

IN RE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

45

operates as an investigatory body responsible for “determining
whether or not a crime has been committed.” 69 A 1635 grand jury
in Massachusetts was the first to be used in the United States. 70
Notably, the grand jury was not provided for in the Constitution or
the Judiciary Act of 1789. 71 Grand juries were instead adopted in
1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. 72 The grand jury was established
“as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive persecution . . . .” 73 The grand jury operates in secrecy,
justified by the need to protect the reputation of innocent people,
to prevent warning offenders, and to protect witnesses. 74
The grand jury is a unique body within the criminal justice
system, broadly inquiring into all relevant facts surrounding
suspected criminal conduct. 75 The grand jury is unique because
unlike an Article III court that only has jurisdiction over specific
cases or controversies, the grand jury can investigate simply to
ensure the law is not being violated. 76 Prosecutors in the relevant
jurisdiction request for a judge to impanel a grand jury. 77 The
69.
70.

United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1634–1941, at 6 (1963) (discussing how slowly the Colonies were
to import the grand jury concept from England); see also HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL
GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 1 (describing the origination of the grand jury in
the Magna Carta, which was adopted by King John in 1215).
71. See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury:
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1996)
(discussing the history of the grand jury in the United States).
72. See id. at 11 (discussing how “the centralized government was created
without a federal grand jury”); U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating that the federal
government must utilize the grand jury to charge someone with a federal crime).
73. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
74. See United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I.
1917) (discussing the need for secrecy and the harm that could come from a
newspaper publishing information about the body).
75. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (“A grand jury
investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down
and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed.’” (quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970))).
76. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950)
(allowing grand jury investigations “merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated”).
77. See Amber Phillips, Grand juries, explained for those who kinda sorta
know what they are, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2017) https://perma.cc/669Z-V96Q (last
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grand jury ordinarily consists of sixteen to twenty-three citizens,
needing twelve votes to issue an indictment based on a finding of
probable cause. 78 The grand jury, unlike a petit jury, does not
determine guilt or innocence. 79 The grand jury is instead tasked
with determining whether probable cause exists to “believe that a
crime was committed and that a specific person or persons
committed it.” 80 Also unique to the grand jury is that it may issue
subpoenas without first identifying a specific offender or offense. 81
Allowing the attorney-client privilege to shield government
attorneys and employees from answering grand jury subpoenas
violates the duty public entities have to participate in criminal
investigations. 82
IV. The Government Attorney-Client Privilege
A. History of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege
The government attorney-client privilege is difficult to apply
because there is no longstanding governmental attorney-client
privilege in legal history. 83 The first time a court considered
whether the federal government was entitled to claim the
attorney-client privilege was 1963. 84 The court provided almost no
analysis on the issue of whether the government may claim the
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (listing the mechanics of the grand jury) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. See id. (discussing the normal procedures for a federal grand jury);
HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 6.
79. See HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS, supra note 1, at 3
(describing how a petit jury, or normal trial jury, hears evidence from both the
prosecution and defense).
80. Id.
81. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (explaining that the
specific offender and offense are normally developed at the end of the grand jury’s
investigation not at the beginning as in court cases).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (describing the
critical nature of criminal investigations in our justice system).
83. See Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your (Government)
Lawyer May Be Held Against You – The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, 35 URB. LAW. 283, 287 (2003) (“Unlike the private attorney-client
privilege, there is no legal tradition of a government privilege.”).
84. See United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522 (D. Colo. 1963)
(holding that the documents at issue were not privileged).
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privilege, simply implying that the government could assert the
privilege just like a corporation. 85 Case law is scarce prior to 1967,
the same year Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 86 After FOIA was enacted, government officials had to find
other ways to protect confidential information. 87 While FOIA led
to an increase in the volume of case law, that case law did not
necessarily produce a clear justification for the government
attorney-client privilege. 88 Instead, courts applied the privilege in
the government context through analogy, giving the government
the privilege because other clients and entities are entitled to the
privilege. 89 The Sixth Circuit in 2005 upheld the government
attorney-client privilege in the civil context but noted how little
case law there was on the issue. 90 The government, like a
corporation, is an organizational entity who maintains the
attorney-client privilege as the client. 91 One of the crucial
differences between corporations and government agencies
though, is that government agencies are not subject to criminal
liability. 92
The lack of common law jurisprudence adds to the difficulty in
the privilege’s application, requiring a close look at the guiding
85. See id. at 522–23 (citing case law holding corporations have the
privilege).
86. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (forcing government agencies to make certain
information available to the public).
87. See Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients:
Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 480 (2002) (discussing the impact
of FOIA on the development of the government attorney-client privilege).
88. See id. at 481 (“[N]either courts nor scholars have made a compelling
case for a government attorney-client privilege.”).
89. See id. at 481–82 (discussing instances of courts applying the corporate
privilege to the government); see also Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291
(S.D. Cal. 1998) (applying previous Supreme Court holdings that upheld the
privilege in the corporate context).
90. See Ross. v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the little case law that did exist upheld the governmental attorney-client
privilege in the civil context).
91. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 474 (1998) (discussing who
controls the privilege in the entity context).
92. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293–94 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
while the state agency may not be criminally liable, individual employees could
be).
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principles of the privilege itself. 93 These guiding principles include
the danger of testimonial privileges violating the long held belief
that individuals have a right to every man’s evidence. 94 Federal
courts have only recognized privileges in rare circumstances. 95 The
need for evidence is of course contrasted by the desire for
individuals to be able to openly communicate with their attorney. 96
The attorney-client privilege is meant to “encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients . . . .” 97
Sound legal advice is said to serve public ends and receiving such
advice requires confidentiality. 98 The privilege must be narrowly
construed, though, because it withholds potentially relevant
evidence during a trial. 99 Unlike the private attorney-client
privilege, the governmental attorney-client privilege is still very
unsettled. 100
B. Would the Government Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Criminal Investigation Context be an Extension of the Privilege or
an Exception?
The starting point for analysis in this unsettled area of the
privilege doctrine is to determine whether permitting the
application of the government attorney-client privilege in light of
93. See Ross, 423 F.3d at 600 (evaluating the application of the privilege
based on the principles underlying the privilege).
94. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) (relying
on the words of Lord Hardwicke and over three centuries of this guiding principle
being recognized).
95. See id. (listing thirteen federal cases where privileges have been allowed
or contoured); see e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1147 (3d Cir.
1997) (rejecting a parent-child privilege); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335 (1973) (rejecting an accountant-client privilege).
96. See Cohn, supra note 45, at 1254 (discussing the need for open
communication as a rationale for the privilege).
97. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
98. See id. (reviewing precedent for the need to keep such disclosures
confidential).
99. See United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the reduction in discoverable material that will be available during a lawsuit).
100. See Salkin, supra note 83, at 287 (“Although most courts agree that there
is a government attorney-client privilege there is no clear precedent for courts to
use in determining its scope.”).

IN RE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

49

a criminal investigation would be an exception to, or an extension
of the attorney-client privilege. 101
When the Supreme Court held in Swidler & Berlin v. United
States 102 that confidences could not be disclosed after a client’s
death, the Court noted that not protecting the communications
would amount to an exception to the attorney-client privilege. 103
The Court stated that when the privilege is well-established in
common law tradition, an argument with strong supporting
evidence is needed to justify an exception. 104 In the instance of the
privilege applying after death, the Court held that the
“Independent Counsel has simply not made a sufficient showing to
overturn the common law rule embodied in the prevailing
caselaw.” 105 A privilege that has a long history of being recognized
should not be set aside casually. 106
Prior to the In re Lindsey 107 decision, there was essentially no
body of case law to look back on like the Court had in Swidler. 108
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit determined it was its duty to decide
whether the privilege extended to government attorneys in the
criminal grand jury subpoena context “in the light of reason and
experience.” 109 Compare this approach with the one taken by the
101. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the
Office of the President contended that the court would have to find an exception
to the privilege in the grand jury context, while the Independent Counsel argued
that allowing the privilege to apply in the grand jury context would be an
extension).
102. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
103. See id. at 410 (“[H]ere we deal with one of the oldest recognized privileges
in the law. And we are asked, not simply to ‘construe’ the privilege, but to narrow
it, contrary to the weight of the existing body of caselaw.”).
104. See id. at 410–11 (asking for more than speculation in the arguments
against the survival of the privilege after death, and noting that empirical
research would have been helpful).
105. Id. at 411.
106. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47–48 (“Although Rule 501
confirms the authority of the federal courts to reconsider the continued validity
of the Hawkins rule, the long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to
be casually cast aside.”).
107. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
108. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 405 (stating that there was a “great body” of
case law holdings and dicta to refer to).
109. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (“[W]e believe this case
poses the question whether, in the first instance, the privilege extends as far as
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Second Circuit several years later. 110 The Second Circuit reasoned
that an exception to the privilege rule needed to be carved out; this
reasoning is in line with the dissent in the D.C. Circuit. 111 While
acknowledging a lack of on-point case law, the Second Circuit
instead relied on the common-law roots of the privilege generally,
the traditional rationales underlying the privilege, and “the
existence of a governmental attorney-client privilege in civil suits
between government agencies and private litigants.” 112 These
diverging approaches seem to come from differing philosophical
views regarding whether the privilege should apply narrowly or
broadly. 113
Because the attorney-client privilege is a product of common
law, the creation of a rule of privilege is done on a case-by-case
basis. 114 The Supreme Court has expressed a desire to exercise the
Court’s authority to develop rules of privilege in a disciplined
manner. 115 The Second Circuit’s approach is too far out of line with
the precedent set forth by the Supreme Court to be accepted. 116 The
the Office of the President would like.”).
110. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (beginning
their analysis from the perspective that the privilege applies in this context).
111. See id. at 536 (saying they did not see the question before the court to be
whether to “extend” the privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel J., dissenting)
(“Denying that they are creating an exception, my colleagues say that they are
‘defining the particular contours of the government attorney-client privilege,’ but
no court has suggested that the attorney-client privilege must be extended client
by client to each new governmental entity, proceeding by proceeding.”).
112. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 531–32 (“[O]ur application of the privilege in a ‘new’
context remains informed by the long-standing principles and assumptions that
underlie its application in more familiar territory.”).
113. See id. at 531 (“[W]e believe it best to proceed cautiously when asked to
narrow the privilege’s protections in a particular category of cases.”); In re
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege
must be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the
logic of its principle . . . .” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.44 (D.C.
Cir. 1982))).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing courts with the authority to create rules
of privilege); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1268 (“Rule 501 manifests a congressional
desire to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis . . . .”).
115. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (reasoning that while
Rule 501 “provide[s] the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively”).
116. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 536 (declining to adopt a ‘public interest’ or
balancing test, but then simply stating that they will allow the privilege to apply
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Second Circuit acknowledged that its approach was in direct
conflict with several other circuits and that it would create an
inconsistent application of the rules of privilege. 117 When a court is
facing a new area that the attorney-client privilege could be
applied to, the court should begin by determining if the privilege is
applicable at all, not assume it does apply and then look for an
exception. 118
V. Circuit Court Split: Privileged or Not?
A circuit court split has developed over the last twelve years
regarding whether a governmental attorney-client privilege exists
in the face of a federal criminal investigation. 119 The First and
Second Circuits ultimately concluded that the government could
assert the attorney-client privilege when faced with a criminal
grand jury subpoena. 120 The D.C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all
concluded that the government actors in their cases could not
utilize the attorney-client privilege to refuse answering criminal
grand jury subpoenas. 121

in this circumstance).
117. See id. at 536 n.4 (noting that uniformity is important and prevents
issues such as forum shopping).
118. Compare Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (attempting to determine if this
instance was captured by the outer limits of the privilege), with Doe, 399 F.3d at
531 (beginning their analysis from the perspective that the privilege does apply
in this context).
119. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2018) (acknowledging the
existence of a split in circuit opinions).
120. See id. at 30–31 (refusing to uphold the lower court’s holding that there
is a categorical rule forbidding governments from asserting the privilege); Doe,
399 F.3d at 536 (declining to create what the court viewed as an exception to the
privilege, thus allowing the government to assert the privilege).
121. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272 (holding that government lawyers could
not rely on the privilege to shield information from a grand jury); Ill. Grand Jury,
288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to extend the attorney-client privilege
to communications between government lawyers and government employees
when the investigation concerns criminal matters); Whitewater Investigation, 112
F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the governmental attorney-client
privilege would violate the principle that government officials should assist in
criminal investigations).
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A. First Circuit

In July 2018, a three judge panel sitting in the Moakley
courthouse overlooking Boston Harbor heard oral arguments from
two parties, the United States of America and the state of Rhode
Island. 122 Nearly sixty minutes of strong advocacy from each side
followed. 123 Four months later, the judges issued their opinion with
Chief Judge Kayatta authoring the writ of mandamus. 124 Beyond
being the most recent circuit to issue an opinion concerning this
topic, the First Circuit opinion also highlighted serious problems
with the doctrine as it stands today. 125
The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training
(Department) appealed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Rhode Island holding that the attorney-client privilege
is “categorically unavailable to a state government in receipt of a
federal grand jury subpoena.” 126 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that there is no categorical rule that a state
government “has no attorney-client privilege that can be invoked
in response to a grand jury subpoena.” 127
While portions of the record remain sealed, the First Circuit
provided some underlying factual context to the district court
case. 128 A federal grand jury subpoenaed records from the
Department, who in turn moved to partially quash the subpoena
on the grounds that it would compel the production of privileged
communications between government counsel and government
staff. 129 The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
122. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 27 (arguing for Rhode Island was Neil
Kelly, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, arguing for the
United States was Donald Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney).
123. See Oral Argument at 57:00, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018),
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting that the
arguments were meant to be only half of that time) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
124. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 27 (issuing an advisory mandamus and
providing his reasoning for why an advisory mandamus is appropriate in this
case).
125. See id. at 31–32 (failing to resolve these serious uncertainties).
126. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 32.
128. See id. at 27 (discussing the sealed nature of the records but offering a
brief synopsis of the lower court case).
129. See id. (providing no further details due to a presumably still on-going
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ordered the Department to turn over the documents, denying the
motion to quash. 130 Instead of being held in contempt for not
complying with a court order, the Department petitioned the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of advisory mandamus. 131 The
First Circuit dedicated a significant portion of their opinion to
deciding whether a writ of advisory mandamus was available in
this case, ultimately concluding that it was. 132
The court began its substantive analysis by laying a historical
foundation highlighting how “well-established” the privilege is, but
also noting that the privilege is not “limitless.” 133 The court also
acknowledged the competing public interests at stake when
determining the application of the privilege to government
officials. 134 The court cited the four circuits who had previously
weighed in on this issue. 135 Significantly, the court preemptively
stated that the split in decisions is more even than it appears
because only the Second and Seventh Circuits involved federal
grand juries seeking privileged communications from state
officials. 136
The court continued its analysis by considering the most
familiar arguments that a government lawyer should not have the
privilege, “because the lawyers ultimate duty is to the public, that
the governmental entity need not fear prosecution, and that the
privilege need be overborne by the public interest in transparent
grand jury investigation).
130. See id. (holding that “the attorney-client privilege does not shield
communications between government lawyers and their clients from a federal
grand jury” (quoting Order at 2, In re Grand Jury Subpoena (R.I. Dep’t of Labor
and Training), No. 18-4 WES (D.R.I. Apr. 25, 2018))).
131. See id. at 27–28 (forgoing the option of violating the court order, the
Department sought a writ available only in rare cases).
132. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2018) (ruling that the
requisites for a writ of advisory mandamus were satisfied, namely the “novelty of
the question, its substantial public importance, and its likeliness to recur”).
133. See id. at 30 (discussing the need to narrowly construe the privilege
because of the obstacle it presents to the search for truth).
134. See id. (discussing the pros and cons of confidentiality for the public).
135. See id. (citing the Seventh, D.C., Eighth, and Second Circuit opinions).
136. See id. (stating that the split is essentially even because the Seventh
Circuit found that the privilege did not apply, and the Second Circuit found that
it did).
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government.” 137 The court determined that these arguments were
not dispositive because if taken literally they would not allow
government attorneys to assert the privilege in response to civil
subpoenas or discovery requests, violating Supreme Court
precedent. 138 Instead, Judge Kayatta said that more than the
public nature of the Department is needed. 139 The court rejected
the United States’ argument that the “something more” is a
subpoena from a criminal grand jury investigating a crime. 140 The
court effectively rejected the proposition that there is a broad noprivilege rule for government attorneys. 141
The court further distinguished this case from others that
have held that the privilege does not apply in this context by saying
that the Eighth and D.C. Circuit cases turned on a federal statute
requiring federal employees to report wrongdoing. 142 Continuing
this federal-state argument, the court cited the Second Circuit’s
apparent deference to Connecticut and the state’s decisions
concerning how to run its own government. 143
Finally, the court addressed a question that was raised during
oral arguments; should it matter if the grand jury is investigating
possible criminal conduct by government officials themselves, as
137. See id. (highlighting the D.C. and Seventh Circuits use of these
arguments).
138. See id. at 31 (“Unless applicable law provides otherwise, the Government
may invoke the attorney-client privilege in civil litigation to protect confidential
communications between Government officials and Government attorneys.”
(citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 170 (2011))).
139. See id. (“We take from this precedent the conclusion that the public
nature of the Department cannot itself deem the privilege inapplicable.”).
140. See id. (noting that criminal subpoenas are also served on private
entities who are allowed to assert the attorney-client privilege).
141. See id. (“So none of the United States’ principal arguments for sustaining
the broad ‘no privilege’ rule that the district court adopted can carry the day on
their own.”).
142. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31 (distinguishing the cases by saying
that state employees do not have the same reporting requirements as federal
employees under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)). Section 535(b) states that any information
received by an “agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to
violations of Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees
shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General.” 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
(2012).
143. See id. (stating that this conflict “may cut in favor of respecting the
state’s view of the best balance between the public’s interest in government
transparency and the beneficial aspects of the privilege”).
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opposed to the instances in which a grand jury is subpoenaing
information from the government but in connection to a private
entities conduct? 144 Judge Kayatta stated that the United States’
argument would have been much more persuasive if they had
shown that the grand jury’s subpoena was “targeted at wrongdoing
by government officials themselves.” 145 Judge Kayatta stated that
in that instance, the public interest would be in “uncovering and
stopping” crime when it is present in the government itself. 146 He
believed that it was no coincidence that in all three of the circuit
court decisions holding that the privilege did not apply, there was
potential wrongdoing by government actors. 147 During oral
arguments, the attorney for the United States would not discuss
the specific nature of the subpoena, making it clear that they
opposed a level of judicial oversight that would require prosecutors
to tell a state whether they were a target, subject, or simply a
holder of information needed in a criminal investigation. 148
Because the United States did not argue that the wrongdoing being
investigated was by a government actor, the court found the
federal government did not tip the balance of public interest in its
favor. 149
Because Rhode Island’s Attorney General stated that it would
not be their practice to assert the privilege if they knew the
investigation was targeted at government misconduct, the court
did not need to lay out a specific balancing test of when the

144. See id. (stating that the United States would have a much better
argument if the potentially criminal conduct was effectuated by a government
employee).
145. Id. at 32.
146. Id.
147. See id. (outlining how in the Seventh Circuit the suspected wrongdoer
was a governor, and in the D.C. and Eighth Circuits it was the President of the
United States).
148. See Oral Argument at 34:40, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018),
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (arguing that this level
of oversight was not appropriate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
149. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (“[T]he United States made no
attempt to persuade the district court that the grand jury’s subpoena is targeted
at wrongdoing by government officials themselves.”).
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privilege would be usurped by a grand jury subpoena. 150 The court
granted the writ of mandamus, “directing the district court to
vacate its denial of the motion to quash.” 151 The court declining to
adopt a broad no-privilege rule was not overly alarming. 152 On the
other hand, the court’s pursuit of identifying where the public’s
interest lies did lead to alarming results; with the court asking for
access to secret grand jury information in order to determine
whether the privilege should apply. 153 The court held that there is
no categorical rule precluding state governments from asserting
the attorney-client privilege in response to a federal grand jury
subpoena. 154
B. Second Circuit
In 2004, a federal grand jury subpoena was issued pursuant
to an investigation into possible criminal violations by Connecticut
public officials and employees. 155 The U.S. Attorney’s Office was
investigating whether the governor of Connecticut and his staff
had received kickbacks for doing public favors. 156 The testimony of
Anne George, the former legal counselor to the Connecticut
Governor’s Office, was subpoenaed. 157 George appeared before the
150. See id. (leaving that question to presumably be decided by a future
opinion only if the state attorney general’s office asserted the privilege even after
being informed that a state agency was believed to be the offender).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 31 (declaring that the United States did not make an argument
that would sustain the lower courts categorical no privilege rule).
153. See id. at 30 (continuing other circuits’ discussions of public interest
being a major factor in the determination of the government attorney-client
privilege issue).
154. See id. at 32 (qualifying the holding by saying it was on the record as it
has been compiled in this case).
155. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n the
course of investigating possible criminal violations by Connecticut public officials
and employees, and by private parties with whom the state had done business, a
federal grand jury subpoenaed the testimony of Anne C. George, former chief legal
counsel to the Office of the Governor of Connecticut.”).
156. See id. (investigating specifically “whether Governor Rowland and
members of his staff had received gifts from private individuals and entities in
return for public favors, including the favorable negotiation and awarding of state
contracts”).
157. See id. (explaining that Anne George was the “former chief legal counsel”
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grand jury and after testifying that conversations did in fact take
place concerning the receipt of gifts, she asserted the
attorney-client privilege on behalf of her client, the governor. 158
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, ordering
George to testify, stated that the grand jury’s mission to
investigate criminal activity clearly outweighed the interest of the
attorney-client privilege. 159 Governor Rowland and the Office of
the Governor appealed. 160 Even though Governor Rowland
announced his resignation before oral arguments, the court
confirmed that his successor, Governor Rell, would also decline to
waive the privilege. 161
The Second Circuit begins its analysis from the standpoint
that it would “proceed cautiously when asked to narrow the
privilege’s protections in a particular category of cases.” 162 This
starting point can be contrasted to that taken by other circuits who
instead proceeded cautiously to expand the privilege’s
protections. 163 The Government made arguments that fall in line
with the three previous circuits’ holdings. 164 The court was
skeptical about the assumption that the public interest lies in
disclosure. 165 According to the Second Circuit, the balancing of
to the Office of the Governor).
158. See id. at 530 (“Accordingly, asserting the privilege on behalf of her
client, George refused to answer questions pertaining to the content of the
conversations.”).
159. See id. (“[T]he district court concluded that ‘[r]eason and experience
dictate that, in the grand jury context, any governmental attorney-client privilege
must yield because the interests served by the grand jury’s fact-finding process
clearly outweigh the interest served by the privilege.’”).
160. See id. (“Both the Office of the Governor and Rowland, as interested
parties, appealed the district court’s decision.”).
161. See id. (“On August 6, 2004, the newly appointed counsel to the Office of
the Governor informed us that Governor Rell declined to waive the privilege.”).
162. Id. at 531.
163. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (beginning on the
basis that the privilege would need to be extended); Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289,
293 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
164. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 533 (arguing that the client being a public entity is
a big difference from private clients, and that revealing information about
criminal activity is in the public interest).
165. See id. (“We cannot accept the Government’s unequivocal assumption as
to where the public interest lies.”).
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public interest lies between government officials receiving legal
counsel and the truth-seeking function of the grand jury. 166 The
court settled the balancing of interest question by stating that the
public interest lies with public officials seeking out and receiving
competent legal counsel. 167 The court quoted a Connecticut state
statute that it believed showed that the people of Connecticut had
“concluded that the public interest is advanced by upholding a
governmental privilege even in the face of a criminal
investigation.” 168 The court in no way held that the state statute
was dispositive though, and specifically pointed out that they were
just citing the statute as support for where the public interest
lies. 169
The court held that the attorney-client privilege applies to
communications between government actors and government
lawyers because the public interest is best served by it, and the
importance of its protections. 170 The court also decided that it
would not adopt some type of balancing test that would determine
on a case-by-case basis if there was a specific need for evidence that
the privilege should yield to, citing Supreme Court guidance
calling for the need for reliable enforcement of the privilege. 171

166. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Upholding
the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation with government lawyers is
accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of conducting public
business. Abrogating the privilege undermines that culture and thereby impairs
the public interest.”).
167. See id. (“It is crucial that government officials, who are expected to
uphold and execute the law and who may face criminal prosecution for failing to
do so, be encouraged to seek out and receive fully informed legal advice.”).
168. Id.
169. See id. (“But we cite the Connecticut statute to point out that the public
interest is not nearly as obvious as the Government suggests.”).
170. See id. (“Upholding the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation
with government lawyers is accepted as a normal, desirable, and even
indispensable part of conducting public business. Abrogating the privilege
undermines that culture and thereby impairs the public interest.”).
171. See id. (“The Supreme Court has instructed that, where the
attorney-client privilege applies, its protections must be reliably enforced in order
to effectuate its goal of promoting compliance with the law.”).
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C. D.C. Circuit
During an investigation by Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr into the conduct of Monica Lewinsky and President Bill
Clinton, a grand jury subpoena was issued to Bruce Lindsey. 172
Bruce Lindsey was Deputy White House Counsel and an Assistant
to the President. 173 When Lindsey testified before the grand jury,
he refused to answer certain questions, believing that the
questions asked for information “protected from disclosure by a
government attorney-client privilege applicable to Lindsey’s
communications with the President as Deputy White House
Counsel . . . .” 174 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected Lindsey’s government attorney-client privilege
claim, ruling that “the privilege is qualified in the grand jury
context and may be overcome upon a sufficient showing of need for
the subpoenaed communications and unavailability from other
sources.” 175 The Office of the President appealed the district court
order compelling Lindsey’s testimony. 176
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia began
its analysis by acknowledging that the government attorney-client
privilege exists. 177 The court took the approach that under Rule
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is the court’s duty to define
“the particular contours of the government attorney-client
privilege.” 178 The court noted that the Supreme Court has not
172. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1267 (investigating financial transactions by
then President Clinton and whether witnesses had obstructed justice in a civil
lawsuit against President Clinton).
173. See id. (working as a government attorney).
174. See id. (refusing to testify, citing the executive privilege as well as the
attorney-client privilege in his capacity as President Clinton’s personal attorney).
175. Id.
176. See id. (challenging the district court’s interpretation of the government
attorney-client privilege).
177. See id. at 1270 (discussing how it certainly does exist foundationally, but
saying whether the Office of the President can assert it in this instance requires
further analysis).
178. See id. at 1272 (“[P]ursuant to our authority and duty . . . to interpret
privileges ‘in light of reason and experience,’ we view our exercise as one in
defining the particular contours of the government attorney-client privilege.”
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 501)).
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articulated a test for courts to use to determine if an evidentiary
privilege exists. 179 The Supreme Court has stated, though, that
exclusionary privileges “must be strictly construed and accepted
‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify
or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.’” 180 The D.C. Circuit insinuated that as a
starting point this meant that it was not trying to find an exception
to the attorney-client privilege, but instead trying to determine if
the privilege extended broadly enough to encompass this issue. 181
The court questioned whether Lindsey’s conversations with
the President even met the basic requirements for asserting the
privilege, such as being for the purpose of seeking legal advice or
an opinion of law, from a member of the bar, who was acting as an
attorney. 182 The court reasoned that at least a few of the privileged
conversation claims would meet the requirements, and the court
was not precluded from deciding the bigger government
attorney-client privilege issue. 183
The court also distinguished the role of a government lawyer
from that of a private attorney. 184 The court reasoned that
government attorneys’ loyalties are to members of the public and
not solely to their clients or government agencies. 185 The court also
179. See id. at 1268 (discussing alternatively, though, that the Supreme Court
has “placed considerable weight upon federal and state precedent” (quoting In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).
180. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 346 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter J., dissenting)).
181. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that
the Office of the President contended that not upholding the privilege in this
instance would amount to an exception, but then going on to say that the court
viewed it as an extension).
182. See id. at 1270 (stating that the record provided by the district court was
centered more broadly on whether the attorney-client privilege existed, not
whether it would actually apply to the conversations in question).
183. See id. at 1271 (“The parties, we believe, are entitled now to a ruling to
govern Lindsey’s future grand jury appearance.”).
184. See id. at 1272 (“With respect to investigations of federal criminal
offenses, and especially offenses committed by those in government, government
attorneys stand in a far different position from members of the private bar.”).
185. See id. at 1273 (“Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a
government lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client
agency.”).
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noted that the public’s interest is in “uncovering illegality among
its elected and appointed officials.” 186 Concerned about these
public interests, the court proclaimed that “[t]he obligation of a
government lawyer to uphold the public trust reposed in him or
her strongly militates against allowing the client agency to invoke
a privilege to prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the
possible commission of criminal offenses within the
government.” 187 As evidence of where the public’s interest lies, the
court also cited a federal statute that requires government
agencies to report criminal violations. 188 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
requires that if a government agency finds evidence of criminal
violations by government employees, they should be reported to
the Attorney General. 189 The D.C. Circuit made clear that this code
section did not control this case though, because the Office of the
President is not a department as defined in this statute. 190
In rejecting the Office of the President’s arguments, the court
relied heavily on the decision in United States v. Nixon. 191 The
Supreme Court in Nixon created a qualified privilege for executive
communications, denying the executive full privilege in light of a
criminal investigation. 192 The Court in Nixon laid out how
committing to the rule of law requires protecting our adversarial
system of criminal justice, including the presentment of all
relevant facts. 193 The D.C. Circuit explained that it saw no reason
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1274 (“[G]overnment officials holding top legal positions have
concluded, in light of section 535(b), that White House lawyers cannot keep
evidence of crimes committed by government officials to themselves.”).
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2012) (requiring the reporting of violations of title
18 of the U.S. Code).
190. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274 (discussing the definition of the statute
and its inapplicability to this case).
191. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (recognizing a
qualified privilege for the executive’s communications).
192. See id. (determining that criminal investigations are important enough
that in certain instances other important rights and privileges would need to step
aside).
193. See id. at 709 (delving into the history of the United States’ criminal
justice system and the importance of protecting the compulsory process of
presenting evidence).
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why a President’s conversations seeking legal advice should be
given higher protection than those for policy or political advice. 194
While the court did acknowledge that their decision may cause
communication to be chilled between government actors and
attorneys, the privilege will not apply only if the communications
are about criminal wrongdoing. 195
The D.C. Circuit went on to conclude that “it would be contrary
to tradition, common understanding, and our governmental
system for the attorney-client privilege to attach to White House
Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.” 196 The court held
that government lawyers “may not rely on [the] government
attorney-client privilege to shield such information from disclosure
to a grand jury.” 197 The effect of the opinion was to contour the
outer bounds of the government attorney-client privilege. 198
D. Eighth Circuit
President Bill Clinton, and First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton were being investigated by Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr for their ties to several corporations in an investigation that
became known as “Whitewater.” 199 The Whitewater investigation
began years prior to this case and involved business transactions
that occurred prior to Mr. Clinton’s election as President. 200 A
194. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how
only a conceited lawyer could explain why legal advice is more important to the
executive than policy or political advice).
195. See id. at 1276 (“[A]lthough the privacy of these communications may not
be absolute before the grand jury, the Supreme Court has not been troubled by
the potential chill on executive communications due to the qualified nature of
executive privilege.”).
196. Id. at 1278.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1283 (finding that the attorney-client privilege does not extend
to this outer limit).
199. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1997)
(investigating their relationships with “Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan
Association, Whitewater Development Corporation, or Capital Management
Services, Inc.” (quoting In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Assn, Div. No. 94-1,
Order at 1–2 (D.C. Cir. Sp. Div. Aug. 5, 1994))).
200. See Dan Froomkin, Untangling Whitewater, WASH. POST,
https://perma.cc/RV8C-VAT9 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (outlining the
Whitewater investigation and events that led to grand jury subpoenas) (on file
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grand jury issued a subpoena requiring the production of
documents that were created during meetings between Office of
Counsel to the President’s attorneys and Hillary Clinton regarding
Whitewater subjects. 201 The White House refused to produce the
notes pertinent to the subpoena “citing executive privilege,
attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work product
doctrine.” 202 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas did not reach the question of whether the government
attorney-client privilege protected the documents, but instead held
that because the First Lady thought her conversations were
privileged, the attorney-client privilege applied. 203 The Office of
Independent Counsel appealed. 204
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit began by
asking “whether a governmental attorney-client privilege exists at
all in the context of a federal criminal investigation.” 205 This
approach is similar to the one taken in Lindsey, where as a starting
point, the court was not deciding whether these communications
fit an exception to the privilege but whether a privilege existed at
all. 206 The court found that current case law lacked a clear
direction on the issue and instead turned to “general principles.” 207
The court discussed general principles such as the right the public
has to every man’s evidence. 208

with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 913 (requiring the documents
to be produced no matter who else was present at the meetings).
202. Id. at 913–14.
203. See id. at 914 (“The District Court found it unnecessary to reach the
broadest question presented by the OIC, whether a federal governmental entity
may assert the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine in response
to a subpoena by a federal grand jury.”).
204. See id. (“The OIC appealed, and we granted expedited review.”).
205. Id. at 915.
206. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the
competing starting points argued for by the Office of the President and the
Independent Counsel).
207. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 918 (“Lacking persuasive
direction in the case law, we turn to general principles.”).
208. See id. (starting their analysis from the policy position that individuals
have a duty to provide testimony in criminal matters).
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The court reviewed a broad array of potential evidence,
including Supreme Court decisions in Nixon and Upjohn. 209 The
court distinguished Upjohn by pointing out that unlike
corporations, the White House cannot be exposed as an entity to
criminal liability. 210 The second distinction the court made was
that “executive branch employees, including attorneys, are under
a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees
to the Attorney General.” 211 Lastly, concerning the Upjohn case,
the court pointed out that it is in the public’s best interest to have
an open and honest government. 212 The Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that Nixon was distinguishable because President
Nixon never asserted the attorney-client privilege. 213 The court
still found Nixon “indicative of the general principle that the
government’s need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the
needs of the government’s own criminal justice processes.” 214 This
emphasis on the importance of the criminal justice system and its
ability to overcome testimonial privileges is another one of the
foundational “general principles” the Eighth Circuit considered. 215
The court believed that “strong public interest in honest
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would
be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client
privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the
actions of public officials.” 216 The court made clear that
209. See id. at 920 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence).
210. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
actions of White House personnel, whatever their capacity, cannot expose the
White House as an entity to criminal liability.”); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (determining the “scope of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate context”).
211. Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 919.
212. See id. at 921 (“We believe the strong public interest in honest
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill served by
recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal
proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials.”).
213. See id. at 919 (“It is true, as the White House responds, that the
President did not assert an attorney-client privilege in Nixon, and so the case is
not directly controlling.”).
214. Id.
215. See id. at 919–20 (discussing the argument the White House made in
response to this assertion and the reasons why the court believes the personal
attorney-client privilege analogies are incorrect).
216. Id. at 921.
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government actors can still maintain privileged communications
with government attorneys, as long as they do not include criminal
activity that could be investigated by a grand jury in the future. 217
The court also determined that the Office of Independent Counsel
was not trying to invade the privilege the First Lady had in her
personal capacity with her personal lawyer. 218
The court went on to hold that the First Lady’s belief that her
conversations were privileged did not make them privileged, 219
that the presence of other individuals at the meetings did not affect
the privilege, 220 and that the work product doctrine did not apply
in this case. 221
This case is significant because as Judge Kopf suggested in his
dissent, the Eighth Circuit could have adopted an approach that
more closely mirrored the Supreme Court’s in Nixon. 222 Judge Kopf
believed the government should be entitled to the attorney-client
privilege and a showing of necessity and relevancy would need to
be given by the prosecutor in order for the privilege to be set
aside. 223 The court instead held the privilege inapplicable to
217. See id. (“Because agencies and entities of the government are not
themselves subject to criminal liability, a government attorney is free to discuss
anything with a government official—except for potential criminal wrongdoing by
that official—without fearing later revelation of the conversation.”).
218. See id. at 915 (highlighting the White House as the actual party of
interest); see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (making
clear that government officials retain the attorney-client privilege when
confidentially communicating with personal counsel).
219. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 923–24 (“Without delving into
the policy reasons behind these exceptional legal doctrines, we are satisfied that
there is no compelling reason that a reasonable-mistake-of-law rule should apply
in the realm of privileges.”).
220. See id. at 922 (refusing to extend the common-interest doctrine because
the requisite common-interest between clients was missing in this case).
221. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The
White House’s claim of work product immunity founders on the ‘anticipation of
litigation’ requirement of the doctrine.”).
222. See id. at 926–27 (Kopf J., dissenting) (discussing certain procedural
requirements that should be imposed on the Independent Counsel before the
documents could be turned over to a grand jury); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 707 (1974) (resolving the case in a way that allowed for both the judiciary
and the executive branches to retain the proper level of respect).
223. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the special prosecutor should have production requirements and
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government attorneys in the face of criminal proceedings inquiring
into the actions of government officials. 224
E. Seventh Circuit
Federal prosecutors investigating a scandal in the Illinois
Secretary of State’s office attempted to question Roger Bickel, the
Chief Legal Counsel to the Secretary of State’s office. 225 Bickel had
provided legal counsel and advice to the Illinois Secretary of State,
George Ryan, who later became the governor of Illinois. 226 The
scandal consisted of alleged bribe taking, obstruction of justice,
and the improper use of campaign funds. 227 Even after Bickel was
served with a grand jury subpoena, Ryan continued to fight for
Bickel to not testify, claiming their communications were
privileged. 228 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted a motion to compel Bickel’s
testimony, “finding that no attorney-client privilege attached to
the communications at issue, and, alternatively, that if a privilege
did attach, White had effectively waived it.” 229 Ryan appealed the
district court’s ruling, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the question de novo. 230
then an in camera review would be conducted as well).
224. See id. at 921 (majority opinion) (stating in the next sentence that “to
allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield
against the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation
would represent a gross misuse of public assets”).
225. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because of his
role in advising then-Secretary Ryan, federal prosecutors sought to discuss these
matters with Bickel.”).
226. See id. (“Roger Bickel was employed by the state of Illinois as Chief Legal
Counsel to the Secretary of State’s office during the first four years of former
Secretary (now Governor) George Ryan’s administration.”).
227. See id. (involving a three-year investigation by federal prosecutors).
228. See id. at 291 (“Ryan continued to oppose all efforts to obtain allegedly
privileged information from Bickel.”).
229. See id. (finding that White, the current Illinois Secretary of State, could
waive the privilege that would have applied to Bickel and Ryan in their official
capacities).
230. See id. (“We review de novo the question whether Ryan may invoke the
attorney-client privilege to shield Bickel’s testimony before the federal grand
jury.”).
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Opening its analysis in a similar way as the D.C. Circuit and
Eighth Circuit, the court began by stating that a decision to protect
government official’s communications with government attorneys
in light of a federal grand jury subpoena would be an extension of
the attorney-client privilege. 231 Because there are no “deep
historical roots” or common law traditions for applying a
government attorney-client privilege that survives a criminal
investigation, the court resorted to whether policy reasons favor
the application of the privilege. 232
The first reason the court articulated for not upholding the
government attorney-client privilege in the wake of a criminal
investigation is that government lawyers have a “higher competing
duty to act in the public interest.” 233 The court noted that
government attorneys take an oath to uphold the laws of our
country or their respective state, and they are paid by the
taxpayers of that jurisdiction. 234 The second reason the court
provided was that unlike individuals and corporations, “[a] state
agency . . . cannot be held criminally liable by either the state itself
or the federal government.” 235 This is true because the privilege
does not attach to the government employee, but to the
government office itself. 236 Because the privilege runs to the office
and a state agency cannot be held criminally liable, “[t]here is thus
no need to offer the attorney-client privilege as an incentive to
231. See id. at 293 (“While we recognize the need for full and frank
communication between government officials, we are more persuaded by the
serious arguments against extending the attorney-client privilege to protect
communications between government lawyers and the public officials they serve
when criminal proceedings are at issue.”).
232. See id. at 292–93 (“Our decision here instead must rest on whether the
policy reasons for recognizing an attorney-client privilege in other contexts apply
equally when the United States seeks information from a government lawyer.”).
233. Id. at 293.
234. See id. (“It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public assets to
permit a public official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the
taxpayers themselves otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing,
official misconduct, or abuse of power.”).
235. Id. at 294.
236. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (“But the privilege
with which we are concerned today runs to the office, not to the employees in that
office.”).
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increase compliance with the laws.” 237 The court’s final analysis
centered on the fact that “the duty of public lawyers to uphold the
law and foster an open and accountable government outweigh any
need for a privilege in this context.” 238 The court expressly stated
that the public interest is best served by “good and open
government, leaving the government lawyer duty-bound to report
internal criminal violations, not to shield them from public
exposure.” 239 A government employee can also still be protected by
the attorney-client privilege in the criminal context if they were to
consult with a private attorney instead. 240 The D.C. Circuit has
also stated that government officials could consult with private
counsel and retain the traditional privileges protecting their
confidential communications. 241
While not part of the holding, the Seventh Circuit also
responded to a federalism argument made by Ryan. 242 Ryan
argued “that even if federal attorneys lack an attorney-client
privilege in criminal proceedings, state-employed attorneys should
receive one.” 243 This argument was Ryan’s attempt to distinguish
this case from those previously heard in the D.C. Circuit and
Eighth Circuit. 244 The court found no reason to distinguish
between state and federal attorneys, and refused to recognize an
evidentiary privilege that would impair legitimate federal
interests. 245 Because the court ruled that none of the
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id. (“An officeholder wary of becoming enmeshed in illegal acts may
always consult with a private attorney, and there the privilege unquestionably
would apply.”).
241. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how
government counsel in this case was trying to say they were assisting the
President in a personal capacity).
242. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 294 (“Ryan makes one final argument in
favor of his assertion of a governmental privilege: in a word, federalism.”).
243. Id. at 294–95.
244. See id. at 295 (“Neither of the cases on which Ryan relies offered a square
holding that an attorney-client privilege exists between state government lawyers
and their state clients that can override the interests of a federal grand jury.”);
Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274 (attempting to distinguish that all of the government
actors in this case were federal); Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th
Cir. 1997) (same).
245. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (“Having already determined that
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communications between Bickel and Ryan were privileged, there
was no reason for it to decide if the new Illinois Secretary of State
could waive the privilege for conversations that took place prior to
him assuming office. 246
VI. Resolving the Circuit Split: Is a Factors Test or Categorical
Approach Appropriate?
A. Should it Matter Whether the Grand Jury Subpoena is Issued
to a Federal versus State Government?
Several of the circuit court opinions involved a federal grand
jury issuing a subpoena to a state government or actor. 247 While
not part the court’s holding, the First Circuit briefly addressed the
federal-state conflict. 248 Judge Kayatta stated that the
federal-state nature of the conflict may favor allowing a state to
best address the balance of transparency and confidentiality for
themselves. 249 The court went on to rhetorically ask why a federal
grand jury should be able to “overrule a state’s decision on how best
to operate its own government when there is no claim of
wrongdoing by state officials?” 250 The court pointed to the Second
the policy reasons behind the attorney-client privilege do not justify its extension
to government attorneys in the context of criminal investigations, we decline the
invitation to make any distinction between state and federal attorneys for
ill-defined reasons of federalism.”).
246. See id. (expressing no opinion on the determination made by the district
court concerning this issue).
247. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing whether
a state government can invoke the attorney-client privilege against a federal
grand jury subpoena); United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing whether the Office of the Governor of Connecticut was required to
reveal to a federal grand jury the contents of private conversations); Ill. Grand
Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing whether a state government
lawyer could refuse to disclose communications in light of a federal grand jury
subpoena).
248. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31–32 (rejecting a categorical rule that
a state cannot assert the attorney-client privilege in response to a grand jury
subpoena).
249. See id. at 31 (stating that it would be respecting the state’s own views,
but not citing any Rhode Island guidance).
250. Id.
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Circuit opinion for support, but the Second Circuit decision did not
address that question directly. 251
The Second Circuit specifically discussed how it is not bound
by the laws of privilege in the states. 252 Furthermore, when the
court discussed a state statute that would uphold the
governmental privilege for state prosecutors in light of a criminal
investigation, it simply discussed it as context for where the public
interest may lie. 253 Even in upholding the governmental
attorney-client privilege, the Second Circuit did not create a
distinction between state and federal actors being served with a
federal grand jury subpoena. 254
The Seventh Circuit specifically addressed whether it should
matter that the federal grand jury subpoena was directed to a state
government. 255 The State argued that even if a federal attorney
lacked the privilege, federalism concerns should mean that a state
attorney would retain the privilege. 256 The court acknowledged
that the Eighth Circuit, in dicta, noted that a serious federalism
problem could have been implicated in the case if the subpoena had
been issued to a state attorney. 257 Recognizing federalism as being
important in general, the Seventh Circuit still saw no reason why
state lawyers should be treated differently from federal lawyers. 258
The court cited Supreme Court precedent saying it is clear that
“the United States may still sue a state to enforce the nation’s
251. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 530 (discussing how the federal court is not bound
by the law of privilege in the state, and never explicitly presenting a federalism
argument).
252. See id. (citing Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence saying it
requires the application of federal law).
253. See id. at 534 (conceding that if it was a state prosecutor seeking the
information in state court, then the privilege would not apply).
254. See id. at 536 (refusing to qualify the privilege under these
circumstances).
255. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 295 (discussing both recent case law and
an argument made by the state attorney).
256. See id. (arguing that leading case law concerned federal agencies not
state agencies).
257. See id. at 294–95 (discussing the argument in detail, but dismissing the
Eighth Circuit quote as dicta); Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th
Cir. 1997) (discussing a Sixth Circuit case by saying that the federal-state conflict
“implicates potentially serious federalism concerns”).
258. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that a
different result is unjustified by this nuance).

IN RE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE

71

laws.” 259 The court reasoned that this “structural fact” concerning
the federal system implies that there is no immunity enjoyed by
state lawyers from a federal grand jury subpoena. 260 The court
went on to note that “federal courts have never afforded an
evidentiary privilege to the states that is not also afforded to the
federal government.” 261 Affording the state this privilege would
impair the legitimate federal interest in enforcing criminal
statutes, and no distinction should be made between state and
federal attorneys. 262
B. Should the Court Exercise Judicial Oversight over the Grand
Jury?
In Judge Kayatta’s analysis of whether the public interest
weighed in favor of the privilege applying or not, he added to the
list of factors whether the suspected wrongdoing was committed by
a government actor. 263 The First Circuit was the first of the circuit
courts to question whether the analysis should hinge on who is the
target of the subpoena. 264
The Department of Justice’s Justice Manual says that the
target of an investigation “is a person as to whom the prosecutor
or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to
the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the
prosecutor, is a putative defendant.” 265 The subject of an
investigation “is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. (declining to “make any distinction between state and federal
attorneys for ill-defined reasons of federalism”).
263. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (saying that the U.S.
attorney had not attempted to persuade the court that the subpoena was targeted
at government misconduct).
264. See id. (highlighting that all three of the circuits who decided that the
privilege did not apply were clearly deciding the issue knowing that a government
actor was the target of the subpoena).
265. Justice Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/G3EQ-SUJ6 (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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grand jury’s investigation.” 266 The First Circuit opinion does not
get into the granularity of subject versus target, or a general
person of interest, but clearly states that a lot of weight would be
given to a determination that the subpoena is targeted at
government wrongdoing. 267
During the July oral arguments in the First Circuit case, the
State of Rhode Island brought up that the Department did not
know if it was a target or subject of the federal grand jury’s
investigation. 268 The judges posited to the Assistant United States
Attorney (AUSA) arguing the case, that maybe the judiciary
should have oversight over the investigation including finding out
if the person or agency being investigated is the subject or the
target of the investigation. 269 This determination would then be
factored into the judge’s decision concerning whether or not the
government agency or employee’s communications would be
privileged or not. 270 Judge Kayatta’s opinion indicates that if the
United States had revealed who was the target of the
investigation, the scales may have tipped in their favor. 271 The
AUSA made clear during oral arguments that the government did
not believe that this type of hairsplitting judicial oversight over
grand jury subpoenas was the correct solution. 272 The AUSA
highlighted the broad investigatory powers of the grand jury and

266. Id.
267. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (stating simply that the balance may
have been tipped by this revelation).
268. See Oral Argument at 1:27, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018),
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (distinguishing this case
from the other four circuit opinions where the government actor was the
suspected wrongdoer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
269. See id. at 33:30 (discussing the effect of adopting a categorical no
privilege rule, and saying that maybe the government should have to make some
further representation for needing the information).
270. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing how this information
would have been factored into the decision).
271. See id. (stating that a grand jury investigating possible criminal conduct
within the government would have “reinforce[d] and heightened” the importance
of their arguments).
272. See Oral Argument at 34:40, R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2018),
https://perma.cc/URR2-N34C (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (claiming that this type
of oversight would be “completely unworkable in practice”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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its pursuit to show innocence not just criminal wrongdoing. 273
Finally, the AUSA emphasized that it makes no sense to have a
rule where the “analysis rises or falls on the current status of state
employees in the grand jury’s investigation.” 274
The grand jury was purposefully separated from the other
three branches of government by the Framers. 275 The grand jury is
independent from the judiciary “both in the scope of its power to
investigate criminal wrongdoing and in the manner in which that
power is exercised.” 276 The Supreme Court has made their cautious
approach clear; “given the grand jury’s operational separateness
from its constituting court, it should come as no surprise that we
have been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory power as a
basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.” 277 Courts
should not adopt a rule that requires them to parse through grand
jury proceedings and investigations in order to identify who at the
moment of the issuance of a subpoena is a target or subject of the
investigation. 278
Forcing the government to explain too many details
surrounding a subpoena could compromise “the indispensable
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” 279 Asking for secret grand jury
proceeding information is another reason why courts should not
continue trying to identify where the public interest lies

273. See id. at 35:55 (highlighting how practically, the documents being
sought very well may shed a favorable light on the parties).
274. Id. at 30:01.
275. See Roger A. Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 726 (2008) (“While modern grand jury practice may not
evidence the fact, the grand jury is its own constitutional entity, which checks
each of the three branches of government.”); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The grand jury, a constitutional body established in the Bill of
Rights, ‘belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind
of buffer or referee between the Government and the people[.]’” (quoting United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 27 (1992))).
276. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992).
277. Id. at 49–50.
278. See id. at 48 (discussing the functional independence of the grand jury
and their lack of a need to seek the permission of a court to initiate investigations
or issue indictments).
279. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
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concerning whether the government attorney-client privilege
should apply or not. 280
C. Should Courts Employ a Balancing Test?
Courts could adopt and utilize a balancing test to determine if
the attorney-client privilege should apply in a particular instance
as a small number of states have done. 281 This test would weigh
the privacy interests of the individual against the evidentiary
interests in disclosure. 282 Applying this type of balancing test
would require the court to make ad hoc decisions. 283 This would
create a privilege contingent on the factors the court chose to
introduce to determine public interest and the weight the court
gave to those particular factors. 284
The D.C. Circuit avoided creating a balancing test rule. 285
Instead, it concluded that the attorney-client privilege could not be
asserted to avoid turning over information related to possible
criminal violations. 286 The Second Circuit also decided that it
would not adopt some type of balancing test that would determine
on a case-by-case basis if there was a specific need for evidence that
the privilege should yield to. 287 Both courts cited Supreme Court
280. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (looking at public
interest factors such as who is the target of the grand jury investigation).
281. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 32, § 7005 (1964) (forbidding social
workers from testifying about communications made with a client, unless upon a
balancing of administration of justice concerns a court deems it necessary).
282. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Accordingly,
we will determine the appropriate scope of the privilege ‘by balancing the
interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by
disclosure.’”(quoting In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983))).
283. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (“Making the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for
disclosure . . . .”).
284. See id. (discussing the nature of a balancing test analysis as contingent
on a judge’s decision).
285. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278 (“Our analysis, in addition to having the
advantages mentioned above, avoids the application of balancing tests to the
attorney-client privilege—a practice recently criticized by the Supreme Court.”).
286. See id. (adding that this conclusion avoided the subjective approach
proposed by the district court).
287. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 535 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Having
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case law that cautioned against the creation of a balancing test. 288
Although, the Supreme Court in its seminal executive privilege
case essentially employed a balancing test approach. 289 The
Court’s decision to utilize a balancing test is distinguishable
because the Court in Nixon was focused on separation of powers
issues, which inherently requires the balancing of competing
interests. 290
The biggest problem with employing a balancing test is that it
creates uncertainty concerning which communications will be
protected by the privilege. 291 Attorneys working for the
government need to be able to accurately advise government
employees concerning which confidential communications will be
privileged and which will not. 292 The Supreme Court has made
determined that the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications at
issue in this case, we decline to fashion a balancing test . . . .”).
288. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (“We reject the balancing
component of the privilege implemented by that court and a small number of
States.”); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”); In re Lindsey,
158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing specifically to Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998)).
289. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“Since we conclude
that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential
privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that
preserves the essential functions of each branch.”).
290. See id. (“In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and
allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers
were not intended to operate with absolute independence.”).
291. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998)
(“Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests,
even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the
privilege’s application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing
test in defining the contours of the privilege.”); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17
(1996) (“Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the
privilege.”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”).
292. See Swidler, 524 U.S. at 409 (describing the importance of a certain and
irrefutable privilege).
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clear that an uncertain privilege “is little better than no privilege
at all.” 293
There are two reasons why the application of the
attorney-client privilege to government attorneys advising
government employees in light of a criminal investigation should
not be decided utilizing a balancing test. First, before the client
discloses information to their attorney, the attorney should be able
to accurately advise their client concerning the privilege’s specific
application. 294 An uncertain privilege has been characterized as
undemocratic, and being no better than having no privilege at
all. 295 Second, for any privilege to be effective, it must be
administered uniformly. 296 It makes no sense to argue that an
absolute privilege is necessary in order for clients to be candid with
their attorneys and then argue that the privilege “should turn on
the nature of the proceedings in which the privilege is asserted.” 297
The correct approach would be to either contour the privilege from
extending to these specific communications, or simply say that the
privilege will apply. 298
VII. Conclusion
No matter the underlying rationale chosen to justify the
attorney-client privilege, it is an unquestionably “crucial fixture of
293. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
294. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (stating that an attorney
promising confidentiality and then having a trial judge later make a
determination of the validity of the privilege in that instance would “eviscerate
the effectiveness of the privilege”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (discussing how an
uncertain privilege is not much better than no privilege at all); Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876) (“If a person cannot consult his legal
adviser without being liable to have the interview made public the next day by an
examination enforced by the courts, the law would be little short of despotic.”).
295. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 458 (describing an uncertain
privilege as “despotic” meaning arbitrary, undemocratic, or even
unconstitutional).
296. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (discussing how the lower court created a
difficult to apply test that would create unpredictability in its application by
courts).
297. See Leslie, supra note 87, at 496 (pointing out the inconsistencies in these
arguments).
298. See id. (“So long as the privilege’s concern is with governmental rather
than personal needs, there is no need for additional privilege protection.”).
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the American criminal justice system.” 299 An illimitable privilege
would prove prejudicial to the administration of justice, though,
and the outer contours of the privilege must be clearly defined. 300
The government attorney-client privilege is an area of the privilege
doctrine that has been muddied. 301 Five circuits have not been able
to provide clear guidance concerning which communications
between government lawyers and government employees, in the
face of a criminal grand jury subpoena, will remain privileged and
which will not. 302 This uncertainty must be resolved in a way that
affected parties, prior to engaging in important and consequential
conversations, know where the privilege begins and ends. 303 A
categorical rule is the most appropriate and equitable answer.
Employing a balancing test would yield inequitable and
inconsistent results. 304 Even just the discussion of public interest
299. See Cohn, supra note 45, at 1254 (reciting three rationales for the
attorney-client privilege; “professional ethics, the right to privacy or the need to
encourage clients to confide fully in their attorneys”).
300. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (discussing the
importance of the crime-fraud exceptions and its necessity in maintaining the
function of the American adversary system).
301. See, e.g., R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (failing to
sustain a broad no privilege rule, reasoning that something more is required to
prevent the state from having the right to assert the privilege); In re Lindsey, 158
F.3d 1263, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that “government officials have
responsibilities not to withhold evidence relating to criminal offenses from the
grand jury”).
302. See Whitewater Investigation, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997)
(declining to apply the attorney-client privilege); Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289,
295 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283 (same). But see United
States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (failing to abrogate the
attorney-client privilege by compelling chief legal counsel to disclose
communication with the governor of Connecticut); R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at
32 (failing to uphold a categorical rule that would block states from asserting the
privilege in the face of a federal criminal grand jury subpoena).
303. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (stating that
for the privilege to serve its purpose the “attorney and client must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected”).
304. See United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining
that the public interest was in government officials being able to speak openly
and honestly with government counsel). But see Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273
(discussing the public interest in “uncovering illegality among its elected and
appointed officials”).
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factors led the First Circuit into an inappropriate area of judicial
oversight. 305 The grand jury is meant to operate as an entity with
broad investigatory powers and minimal judicial oversight. 306 This
is not meant to imply that the grand jury is without oversight at
all, or that it should operate outside of the confines of the
Constitution or common law testimonial privileges. 307 Testimonial
privileges certainly apply in the grand jury context. 308 This Note in
no way suggests that they should not, but also recognizes
jurisprudence cautioning against “[f]requent or undue court
intervention in the proceedings of a grand jury . . . .” 309 Other
issues have arisen when courts attempted to identify public
interest including; inconsistent opinions, 310 the use of varying
factors, 311 and the underlying need for a certain privilege. 312 In
short, the balancing of public interests has not worked and should
be declined altogether. 313
It should not matter whether the federal grand jury has issued
a criminal subpoena to a state or federal government person or
305. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 32 (discussing how the United States’
argument for abrogating the privilege would have been stronger if they had
disclosed information normally kept secret by a grand jury).
306. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973) (stating that for
the grand jury to performs its constitutional function, “it must be free to pursue
its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it
does not trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it”); United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50–51 (1992) (highlighting the Court’s reluctance
for imposing judicial oversight over the grand jury).
307. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 48 (discussing the outer limits of the grand
jury’s power).
308. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that the confidential marital communications privilege could be
asserted in light of a grand jury subpoena).
309. Id. at 864.
310. See Doe, 399 F.3d at 534 (discussing the public interest weighing against
allowing the privilege). But see Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 (stating that the court
would not apply a balancing test, but discussing the public’s interest in
disclosure).
311. See R.I. Grand Jury, 909 F.3d at 31–32 (introducing the factor
considering who is the target of the investigation); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272
(discussing federal statutes calling for federal employees to uphold a
constitutional government).
312. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (calling for a privilege that enables
individuals to make informed decisions concerning protected disclosure).
313. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to create
a balancing test).
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entity. 314 In light of the underlying policy rationales, there is not a
compelling reason to extend the attorney-client privilege to
government attorneys faced with a criminal grand jury
subpoena. 315 The attorney-client privilege comes at a cost. 316 Every
time a testimonial privilege is honored, potentially relevant
evidence is not presented. 317
Testimonial privileges should be consistent and certain. 318
Justice O’Connor wrote that the Supreme Court would be reluctant
to expand or create a new privilege unless to “do so will serve a
‘public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’” 319 Government
attorneys withholding evidence from the purview of a criminal
grand jury subpoena is not serving the public good. A categorical
rule preventing government attorneys from asserting the
attorney-client privilege in response to criminal grand jury
subpoenas is the most fitting conclusion.

314. See Ill. Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding
federalism concerns were not relevant in this situation).
315. See id. (failing to find a justifiable reason for extending the privilege).
316. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“[S]ince the
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it
applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”).
317. See id. (discussing this withholding of evidence as a compelling reason
for limiting privileges to those that are necessary).
318. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (trying
to keep uncertainty out of the privilege doctrine).
319. Id. at 411 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).

